Special Report: Roots of Rage Part II // FAI ONLINE

Pictured left to right are Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin, U.S. president Bill Clinton, and Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat. In 1993, the three leaders met in Washington to sign the Israeli-PLO peace accord. © AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS.

Part 2: Oslo, International Law, Antisemitism, and a War of Words

Devon Phillips

This article is the second installment of a Wire series on the varied factors of the global controversy and conflict with Israel, especially in light of the war with Gaza in May 2021. You can read the first installment here.

For eleven days in the middle of May 2021, there was an outbreak of violence in Israel and Gaza that included widespread protests, rocket attacks on Israel from groups in Gaza like Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Israeli airstrikes targeting the Gaza Strip. Throughout the conflict, which was sparked most immediately by the controversial court cases of the disputed properties in Sheikh Jarrah in East Jerusalem and tension surrounding the Al-Aqsa complex during the height of Ramadan, Israel and Gaza made international headlines. They became a central talking point from politicians to protestors around the world. Jewish people living in the diaspora began to experience an astronomical rise in antisemitism, and the state of Israel found itself under a different barrage than the rockets coming out of Gaza, a barrage of accusations and insinuations as to the legality and the morality of its actions in response to Hamas' attacks. Was Israel committing war crimes? Did Israel's alleged breaking international law justify Hamas breaking international law? Is it fair to hold the broader Jewish community responsible for Israel's actions? Some of these are difficult questions (others, not so difficult!). Still, so often, the nuance of the situation was lost amid an alphabet soup of buzzwords so designed to emotionally corral readers into a clear idea of the good and the bad that the facts that might shed light and provide answers are hopelessly obscured. With so many longstanding and intractable conflicts, we can't begin to understand the roots without some context from history.

International Law and the Oslo Accords

Young Palestinians trow rocks at an Israeli tank in 2000. This image became the international impression of the conflict of the First Intifada.

A natural question that you might ask, looking at Gaza today, is why Hamas and Islamic Jihad would attack Israel after Israel had fully withdrawn from the Gaza Strip in 2005? Surely military occupation could not be the reason. The immediate causes stated by Hamas were clear enough. They set themselves up as the defenders of the Palestinians living in the West Bank and guardians of the Aqsa mosque complex. The Sheikh Jarrah property disputes and Temple Mount riots were areas of serious offense. The Palestinian Authority in the West Bank was also set to have elections. Hamas wanted to boost its popularity in the West Bank and hoped to oust the current ruling party, Fatah, and thus control Gaza and the West Bank.

But beyond these political considerations, there are also deep ideological roots to Hamas' rejection of Israel's existence. The 1988 Hamas Covenant states that "Israel will exist and continue to exist until Islam obliterates it." It then continues later: "There is no solution to the Palestinian question except through Jihad." These founding declarations provide no room philosophically for negotiation. They are utterly incompatible with the "two-state solution" that many hoped would be the fruit of the consequential Oslo Accords of the 1990s.

The Oslo Accords were born in a unique convergence of events that created an optimal opportunity for genuine dialogue between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the chief representative of the Palestinian cause. The first Intifada (that is, uprising) by the Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza against Israel that began in 1987, presented a somewhat coordinated and united PLO to a sympathetic international press, who saw the stone-throwing Palestinian protestors against the mighty Israeli military as a modern rendition of David and Goliath. However, the stone-throwing quickly devolved into Molotov cocktails, gasoline bombs, and stabbings.

Though the Intifada was a catalytic event on the road to Oslo, the PLO made several tactical errors that significantly lessened their advantages before entering negotiations. The collapse of the Soviet Union left the PLO without superpower support. Believing that Iraq could help the Palestinian cause, Arafat sided with Saddam Hussein during the Gulf Crisis (1990–1991) and thereby lost the financial support he might have otherwise received from the Gulf states.

On Israel's side, the collapse of the Soviet Union, mass Jewish immigration to Israel, and the destruction of Iraq's army in 1991 greatly enhanced Israel's security. They had longstanding peace with both Jordan and Egypt, and security zones borne from the wake of the multi-front war of 1967 seemed less urgently or strategically needed. The Intifada convinced the Israeli left that wholly occupying the Palestinian territories was too costly for international isolation and domestic discord. Granting self-government to the Palestinians, especially from a position of security and strength, would not seem like Israel was making concessions due to desperation or fear of terrorist tactics.

Moreover, more and more Palestinians and Israelis concluded no military action would solve their conflict. The PLO had galvanized Palestinians and gained international recognition, but its armed struggle against Israel failed to liberate an inch of Palestine. Even though Israel was considered to be the fourth strongest military power in the world, it could not destroy the PLO or subdue a civilian population of two million in the occupied territories. Both sides concluded that mutual recognition and dividing the land was the only viable option.

Given this atmosphere of openness, U.S. president George H. W. Bush and Secretary of State James Baker III had an unprecedented opportunity to broker peace in the Middle East by arranging the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991 between Israel and the Arabs, including the Palestinians. While it looked initially promising, with a moderate Israeli coalition led by Yitzhak Rabin having an official policy of "land for peace," negotiations eventually proved unfruitful with the Palestinians considering the structure of the talks as inequitable and rejected the United States as "honest brokers."

In the wake of the Madrid Peace Conference, Norway's foreign ministry arranged for a private, secret channel in Oslo for two Israeli scholars, Yair Hirshfeld and Ron Pundak, and a PLO economist and aide to Chairman Arafat, Ahmad Sulayman Qurai. Negotiations began in the winter and spring of 1993. Israel and the PLO initialed two sets of documents in Oslo in late August: an exchange of letters of mutual recognition and the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DOP).

On 9 September 1993, Arafat signed the PLO letter recognizing Israel's right to exist, accepted Security Council Resolution 242, renounced the use of terror and violence, and pledged to remove clauses in the Palestinian Covenant calling for the elimination of Israel. The next day Rabin signed Israel's letter, recognizing the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and declaring Israel's intention to negotiate with the PLO. Implicit was Israel's recognition of Palestinian demands for self-determination and independence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Artist’s rendition of Mohammed’s caravan approaching Mecca.

The second document, the DOP, which was signed at the White House on 13 September 1993, outlined a five-year plan for Palestinian self-government, starting with Israel's withdrawal of troops from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank town of Jericho, and the transfer of authority over economic development, education and culture, taxes, social welfare, public health, and tourism. Elections of an interim self-government council followed this agreement. After the second year, negotiations would begin on Jerusalem, refugees of 1948, Jewish settlements, and borders.

Though this agreement was a historic step, it postponed many of the most controversial and consequential issues to pass the initial rounds of approval. Islamist groups such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad rejected the accords entirely and conducted several deadly terrorist attacks that significantly disrupted the peace process. Negotiations over the implementation of the interim agreement dragged on until another was signed in Cairo in May 1994. Then Israel's troops withdrew, and Palestinian police took over in Jericho and the Gaza Strip. Though violent objection continued throughout the process, Oslo II was signed at the White House on 28 September 1995, setting the stage for Israel's further withdrawal from the West Bank and for Palestinian elections.

While Israel was giving up something very concrete—land—for a future, abstract hope of peace, there was widespread fear that the PLO was not negotiating in good faith towards coexistence but instead merely using the Accords as a means of gaining strength to launch deadlier and deadlier attacks on Israel. The PLO's original charter had initially called for the destruction and overthrow of Israel, but that was amended in light of Oslo. However, the concept remained a central aspect of the current covenants of Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Fears of double-dealing seemed to be justified when Arafat said, in response to Arab press questioning him on the concessions of Oslo, replied, "Remember the treaty of Hudaybiyyah."

While such a comment would seem obscure to a non-Muslim audience, the hearers understood Arafat's reference well. The Treaty of Hudaybiyyah was a treaty between the Prophet Mohammad and the Qurayshi tribe of Mecca. In AD 628, Mohammed traveled with 1,400 of his followers from Madinah, ostensibly making a pilgrimage to the Kaaba in Mecca. It was general practice for pilgrims to be allowed entry into the city without question. Still, the size of the Muslim band, their evangelistic success in recruiting converts, and the looting of caravans entering and exiting the city caused the controlling tribe of Qurayshi to view the travelers with suspicion and refuse them entry to the city of Mecca. However, the Qurayshis sent messengers to Mohammed at his camp outside Mecca proper, and they negotiated a peace treaty—the treaty of Hudaybiyyah—that guaranteed ten years of peace between the two parties and free access to Mecca for pilgrimage. However, Mohammed broke this treaty a mere two years later, attacking and conquering the city of Mecca.

Arafat's reference to Hudaybiyyah proved to be only too accurate. Negotiations between Israeli Prime Minister Barak and Arafat, mediated directly by Clinton at Camp David in July 2000, broke down. On 29 September 2000, the day after Ariel Sharon and an Israeli security force of 1,000 visited al-Haram al-Sharif, or Temple Mount, the Second Intifada broke out. Arafat encouraged the violence in the hope of achieving diplomatic gains he could not get at the negotiating table. This belligerence broke one of the most fundamental agreements of Oslo: that the PLO would cease attacking Israel. Oslo had effectively unraveled, with some Israelis going so far as to call the second Intifada the "Oslo War."

The Second Intifada lasted for four years and is generally believed to have ended at the Sharm al-Sheikh Summit in February 2005, where Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon again agreed that all Palestinian factions would stop all acts of violence against Israelis everywhere, and all Israeli military action would cease against all Palestinians. Sharon released 900 Palestinian prisoners, withdrew from several West Bank towns, and fully disengaged from Gaza.

This complete disengagement from Gaza and the subsequent power vacuum caused the Oslo governmental structures of free and fair elections to be cast aside after Hamas won in the polls and then secured their position in a bloody struggle with the opposing Fatah party. Since then, Hamas has dominated the Gaza Strip, causing significant steps backward for both the Palestinian citizens of Gaza, whose millions of dollars in international aid is often redirected into the pockets of the powerful and building the more and more sophisticated rocket arsenal that Hamas has used to launch attacks at Israel four times since the withdrawal in 2005. This poor outcome has caused Israel to view the "land for peace" principle of the 1990s as a completely ineffective tool for lasting peace.

In light of the agreements of Oslo and their subsequent breakdown, it might seem strange that the Oslo Accords still govern a great deal of what is talked about when it comes to international law and the relationship and responsibilities of Israel to the Palestinian Territories. Familiarity with the contents of the Oslo Accords is vital today in light of the often-evoked accusation of Israel breaking international law.

For example, when the coronavirus was raging throughout Gaza and the West Bank, Israel was the object of widespread global disgust for not providing Gazans with vaccines. The Geneva Conventions were often cited, stating that it is the occupying power's responsibility to provide for the medical needs of the occupied population. However, the Oslo Accords state that in the specific relationship of Israel and the Palestinian Authority, the PA has the right to have complete control over their healthcare system as part of their self-determination. Israel did later make vaccines available to Palestinians contrary to the binding stipulations of Oslo, but it was too late to satisfy the critics.

This instance is an excellent example of Israel's complicated relationship with "international law." On the one hand, it was a United Nations resolution that recognized the legitimacy of the Jewish state of Israel in 1948. However, since that time, the UN has had a distinctly adversarial attitude to all things Israel. The Anti-Defamation League, a longstanding and respected legal organization fighting antisemitism, provides a helpful framework for distinguishing legitimate criticism of Israel from antisemitism cloaked as political activism. The test involved three "Ds": demonization, double standards, and delegitimization. In its many resolutions condemning Israel, the UN often demonstrates egregious double standards, a fact which is not lost on most Israelis. This unbalanced focus puts Israel between a rock and a hard place, constantly trying to appease a system that acts fundamentally antisemitic, as well as keeping its own security needs in view.

This tightrope is tough to navigate in the PR war that is taking place in the press simultaneous to the actual war being waged on the ground. How can Israel defend their actions with legal arguments from treaties such as Oslo when the headlines scream, "WAR CRIMES!"

I Don't Think it Means What You Think It Means

When it comes to conflict in the Middle East, it is impossible to exaggerate the influence of the global press. No one is more aware of this power than the Palestinians. Indeed, in light of the ceasefire that ended the latest round of conflict between Israel and Hamas, Hamas declared that they were the victorious party, and Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Lebanese Hezbollah and master media manipulator, agreed. In a lengthy speech entitled "Victory Workshop," Nasrallah declared that Hamas achieved the victory of the 2021 Gaza War thanks to the media. The narrative as narrated by Hamas is often unquestioned, and the new social media platforms allow the propaganda to spread to even less critically thoughtful audiences virally.

Nasrallah explains that media and publicity are war tools. Just as there is research and development for military systems, one must also invest in media and publicity. Nasrallah addresses all the supporters of the Palestinian resistance and instructs them in detail on how they must act to achieve the "victory narrative." Nasrallah then gives a clear list of "do's and don'ts" and emphasizes that every supporter of the Axis of resistance is a tool in the system built to strengthen the narrative.

Nasrallah is well aware that the pressure exerted on Israel through international public opinion is much stronger than any other weapon that the Axis of resistance has. Despite the axis' tremendous advantage over Israel in this field, he is now calling for "serious staff work" to upgrade this tool against Israel for future campaigns.

This highly strategic use of social media has been so effective in part because of the use of words that carry much emotional weight, claiming volumes in just a few syllables. To question such terms as "colonialism," "apartheid," and "war crimes" would seem to align the reader with some of the worst sins of the last few centuries. Never mind that such words in the hands of propagandists have been stretched well beyond their actual meaning to slanderous levels.

The cumulative effect of this avalanche of accusation has been to create a grossly simplified story, a modern morality play in which the Jews of Israel display more than any other nation's moral failure and malice. This deeply antisemitic stance, unfortunately, does not just negatively affect Israel's ability to receive fair and truthful coverage in her actions but also impacts the broader Jewish community, irrespective of their stance on Israel's national policies.

Khaybar, Khaybar ya Yahood

Protestors gather outside of the Israeli consulate in Chicago on May 12, 2021. Shafkat Anowar, AP.

The ADL reported that antisemitic incidents in the U.S. more than doubled during the May 2021 military conflict between Israel and Hamas and its immediate aftermath compared to the same period in 2020. Most of the rage was driven by the direct association with all Jewish peoples with the state of Israel. But is it fair to say that the disgust of those vandalizing, harassing, and assaulting their Jewish neighbors was purely politically driven, or was something more ideologically sinister at the root of it?

Perhaps the easiest way to judge is from the protests held across the globe during the May 2021 conflict. One widespread and popular chant was, "Khaybar Khaybar, ya yahud, Jaish Muhammad, sa yahud," which means, "Jews, remember Khaybar, the army of Muhammad is returning." What is this referencing?

"Khaybar" refers to the Muslim massacre of the Jews of the town of that name in northwestern Arabia in 628 CE. The Muslim conquerors charged surviving Jews a 50 percent tax on their crops, and in 637, after Muhammad's death, the Caliph Omar expelled the remaining Jews from Khaybar. This battle chant has been used over the centuries when attacking Jews or Israelis. Of course, the original circumstance well preceded Israel and the "provocation" of a Jewish state occupying Muslim populations.

Another common phrase chanted at protests is: "From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free." While freedom always has a popular, positive ring to it, the insidious implication of this chant is that the state of Israel, with its borders on the Jordan River and the Mediterranean, must cease to exist for Palestine to be free. This one-state suggestion, which is becoming more and more popular, would be disastrous for Israel, which would become a Jewish minority subject to a Muslim majority whose taunts of "khaybar" would most likely become a reality.

This widespread rejection of the two-state solution is yet another symptom of Oslo's diminishing influence. Although the two-state solution seemed to be the only way viable way forward without the destruction of the Jewish state of Israel or the unending military occupation of the Palestinian Territories, the mindset of many spokespeople of the Palestinian cause has devolved to, "we don't negotiate with colonialist apartheid criminals." And thus, the uneasy impasse of the last two decades has become punctuated with more and more frequent bursts of violence.

So we can see that the roots of rage have burrowed so profoundly that it is impossible to pull them out with diplomatic negotiations. Rather than the flash of positive momentum that seemed to spark in the imperfect and short-lived Oslo accords, much of the last two decades have devolved into further estrangement and completely incompatible goals. Israel sees that it is vital to remain a majority Jewish nation, and the Palestinians are less and less willing to pursue the two-state pipe dream of Oslo. All this is vastly complicated by the double standards of the United Nations and International Criminal Court when it comes to all things Israel and the skillful manipulation of the press by Palestinian advocates to further the false and simplistic narrative that Israel is a fundamentally evil actor. In these conditions, the best that can be hoped for is a status quo, but as the Gaza war of 2021 clearly demonstrates, this impasse will not last forever.